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Default and Repayment among
Baccalaureate Degree Earners
Lance J. Lochner 
University of Western Ontario
 
Alexander Monge-Naranjo
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and 
Washington University in St. Louis
A growing number of college students in the United States borrow 
thousands of dollars from public and private lenders to fi nance their 
higher education, and an increasing portion of them have been default-
ing on their obligations. Over the past decade, the total number of Staf-
ford Loan borrowers has nearly doubled to 10.4 million recipients in 
2011–2012. In recent years, undergraduates have borrowed more than 
$70 billion annually in federal student loans. More ominously, student 
loan default rates have risen continuously since 2005 after falling for 
more than a decade. Three-year cohort default rates stand at 13.4 per-
cent for students entering repayment in 2009. Among students from pri-
vate for-profi t institutions, three-year default rates exceed 20 percent.1 
Against this backdrop, there is growing concern that many students are 
borrowing too much, especially in the wake of the Great Recession. 
These developments have led to renewed interest in the design of fed-
eral student loan programs, including a reevaluation of student borrow-
ing limits, interest rates, and income-contingent repayment schemes. 
Unfortunately, much of this discussion is occurring amid scant sys-
tematic evidence on the determinants of student loan repayment and 
default, especially for recent cohorts.
Dynarski (1994), Flint (1997), and Volkwein et al. (1998) study 
the determinants of student loan default using nationally representa-
tive data from the 1987 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study that 
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surveyed borrowers leaving school in the late 1970s and 1980s. Other 
empirical studies have generally examined default behavior at specifi c 
institutions or in individual states in the United States.2 Gross et al. 
(2009) provide a review of this literature and conclude that factors such 
as race, socioeconomic background, educational attainment, type of 
postsecondary institution, student debt levels, and postschool earnings 
are important determinants of default. Minorities, students from low-
income families, and college dropouts all tend to have higher default 
rates, as do students attending two-year and for-profi t private institu-
tions. Default is also more likely for those with high debt levels and low 
postschool earnings.
We go beyond previous analyses of default to consider other impor-
tant measures of student loan repayment and nonpayment that are likely 
to be of greater interest to potential lenders (public or private). Most 
lenders are concerned about the expected return on their investments, 
although government lenders may have other objectives. While default 
is a key factor affecting the expected returns on student loans, other fac-
tors can also be important. For example, government student loans offer 
opportunities for loan deferment or forbearance, which temporarily 
suspend payments.3 The timing of default and deferment/forbearance 
can also infl uence returns to lenders. From the lender’s point of view, 
it matters if a borrower defaults (without reentering repayment) imme-
diately after leaving school or after fi ve years of standard payments. 
The discounted value of payments from the former is much lower than 
from the latter. Similarly, the discounted present value of payments is 
much lower for borrowers who defer payments for extended periods of 
time than for those who do not. These simple examples suggest that the 
credit-worthiness of different types of borrowers (based on their back-
ground or their schooling choices) depends on the expected payment 
streams and not simply whether they had ever entered default or are 
currently in default at some arbitrary survey date.
Unfortunately, an analysis of expected returns across different 
types of borrowers is impossible given current data sources, since it 
requires data on potential determinants of repayment and access to 
full repayment histories. As far as we know, these data are not avail-
able. In this chapter, we use data from the Baccalaureate and Beyond 
Longitudinal Studies (B&B) to analyze a number of different repay-
ment and nonpayment measures that provide useful information about 
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expected returns on student loans. As discussed further in the follow-
ing section, the B&B follows a random sample of 1992–1993 U.S. 
college graduates for 10 years and contains rich information about 
the individual and family background of respondents, choice of col-
lege major and institution, student borrowing levels, postschool earn-
ings, and loan repayment status (including outstanding balances) 5 and 
10 years after graduation. We use the student loan records to compute 
fi ve different measures related to repayment and nonpayment of stu-
dent loans 10 years after graduation: 1) the fraction of initial student 
debt still outstanding; 2) an indicator for default status; 3) an indicator 
for nonpayment status (includes default, deferment, and forbearance); 
4) the fraction of initial debt that is in default; and 5) the fraction of 
initial debt that is in nonpayment. We then study the determinants of 
all of these repayment/nonpayment measures, focusing on the roles of 
individual and family background factors, college major, postsecondary 
institution characteristics, student debt levels, and postschool earnings. 
We fi nd that many of the factors identifi ed in earlier studies are impor-
tant for our more recent sample of borrowers; however, the importance 
of some factors depends on the measure of repayment or nonpayment 
under consideration. We highlight a number of general lessons and open 
questions arising from our results in the concluding section.
DATA: THE BACCALAUREATE AND BEYOND
LONGITUDINAL STUDY
We use the B&B to analyze patterns in student loan repayment and 
default for college graduates up to 10 years after graduating. The B&B 
was initially drawn as a subsample from the 1993 National Postsecond-
ary Student Aid Study, a nationally representative random sample of 
all postsecondary students in the United States.4 More specifi cally, the 
B&B has followed the roughly 16,000 respondents who received bac-
calaureate degrees in the 1992–1993 academic year through 2003. The 
B&B uses data from three basic sources: 1) survey data in 1993, 1994, 
1997, and 2003; 2) institutional records on college costs and fi nancial 
aid; and 3) snapshots from student loan administrative records in 1998 
and 2003. With extensive information about family background and 
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demographic characteristics, student achievement as measured by SAT/
ACT scores, college-related outcomes (e.g., undergraduate major, insti-
tution attended, graduate school attendance, and postgraduate degrees), 
labor market outcomes every few years, and student loan balances and 
repayment status 5 and 10 years after graduation, the B&B offers a 
unique opportunity for studying student loan repayment and default 
behavior in the United States.
The B&B sample is relatively homogeneous in its educational 
attainment: all students have at least a BA/BS degree. The lack of col-
lege dropouts and students with less than four-year degrees is unfortu-
nate, since previous research shows that repayment problems are most 
common among these individuals.5 Still, we fi nd that many students 
who graduated from college in 1992–1993 have experienced repayment 
problems.
To focus on a typical American college student, we exclude non-
citizens, the disabled, and individuals receiving their BA/BS at age 
30 or older (less than 14 percent received their BA/BS at later ages). 
Because new graduates who then attend graduate school are eligible 
for automatic loan deferments when they are enrolled, they will have 
spent less time in repayment. This directly reduces their opportunities 
for both repayment and default within any given time frame, making it 
diffi cult to compare their repayment/default outcomes with those of stu-
dents who have not participated in postgraduate studies. Our main anal-
ysis, therefore, excludes respondents who attended 12 or more months 
of graduate school as of 1997, received any postgraduate degrees by 
2003, or were enrolled in school in 2003.6 Altogether, this leaves 4,300 
U.S. citizens who received baccalaureate degrees in 1992–1993 but 
participated in little schooling thereafter. Roughly half of these gradu-
ates report that they borrowed money for their undergraduate school-
ing as of 2003. Our analysis of repayment and default focuses on these 
2,180 borrowers.
The B&B contains standard demographic characteristics such as 
gender and race/ethnicity (Asian, black, Hispanic, white). We also use 
measures of maternal education, categorizing students based on whether 
their mothers never attended college, attended but did not receive a BA/
BS, or completed their BA/BS. Dependency status (for fi nancial aid 
purposes) is also available for students, along with parental income in 
1991 for those who are dependents. The B&B also contains data on 
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student SAT and ACT scores. We categorize individuals into quartiles 
based on their SAT scores if they are available. If an individual did 
not report an SAT score, we use the corresponding ACT quartile.7 The 
data also include information about the major course of undergradu-
ate study and the type of institution from which individuals graduated 
(public, private nonprofi t, private for-profi t, historically black college/
university). We use the undergraduate institution from which individu-
als graduate to include a measure of the selectivity of the institution as 
determined by Barron’s 1992 Admissions Competitiveness Index. We 
consider the following three competitiveness categories: 1) most com-
petitive and highly competitive, 2) very competitive and competitive, 
and 3) all others. Sample averages for all of these variables are reported 
for our sample of borrowers and nonborrowers, as well as borrowers 
only, in Table 8A.1.
Our main focus is on student borrowing, repayment, and default 
measured 10 years after graduation. As noted earlier, roughly half of 
our sample borrowed funds for their undergraduate studies. Among 
those who borrowed, the average amount of undergraduate loans was 
$9,300. On average, another $600 was borrowed for graduate studies. 
The latter amount is small, since our sample restrictions ensure that 
students in our sample spent very little (or no) time in graduate school. 
Ten years after graduation, borrowers still owed, on average, $2,600 on 
their undergraduate loans. Two-thirds had repaid their undergraduate 
loans in full.
Table 8.1 reports repayment status for borrowers as of 1998 and 
2003. In both years, 92 percent were repaying their loans or had already 
fully repaid their loans. The fraction of borrowers receiving a defer-
ment or forbearance declined from 3.8 percent in 1998 to 2.5 percent in 
2003, while the share of borrowers in default rose from 4.2 percent to 
5.8 percent over this period.8 These fi gures suggest that deferment and 
forbearance are important forms of nonpayment with a diminishing role 
over time: They make up nearly half of all nonpayments fi ve years after 
school, falling to slightly less than one-third fi ve years later. 
Table 8.2 shows transition rates for these repayment states from 
1998 to 2003. The rows in the table list the probabilities of being in 
repayment (including those who fully repaid), receiving a deferment 
or forbearance, or being in default 10 years after school (in 2003) con-
ditional on each of those repayment states fi ve years earlier in 1998. 
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Ninety-four percent of borrowers in repayment (including those who 
had fully repaid) in 1998 were also making their payments or had 
fully repaid their loans by 2003. Four percent of borrowers who were 
in repayment (or fully repaid) in 1998 were in default fi ve years later. 
Only 75 percent of borrowers in deferment/forbearance in 1998 were in 
repayment (or fully repaid) fi ve years later, while 16.5 percent were still 
in deferment/forbearance and 8.5 percent were in default. Among those 
in default in 1998, 54 percent had returned to repayment (or had fully 
Table 8.1  Repayment Status for Undergraduate Borrowers 5 and 10 
Years after Graduation
Status 1998 2003
Fully repaid 0.269 0.639
(0.013) (0.013)
Repaying or fully paid 0.920 0.917
(0.008) (0.007)




NOTE: Estimates are based on the B&B sample of borrowers. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Table 8.2  Repayment Status Transition Probabilities
Repayment status in 2003





Repaying or fully paid 0.939 0.020 0.040
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
Deferment or forbearance 0.749 0.165 0.085
(0.063) (0.057) (0.032)
Default 0.544 0.038 0.418
(0.070) (0.020) (0.068)
NOTE: The table shows the probability of each status in 2003 conditional on the status 
in 1998. Estimates based on the B&B sample of borrowers. Standard errors are in 
parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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repaid) fi ve years later, while 42 percent remained in default. Although 
there is considerable persistence in these repayment states, many bor-
rowers who were not making payments fi ve years after school (i.e., in 
deferment/forbearance or default) were making payments (or had fully 
repaid their loans) fi ve years later. Not surprisingly, deferment/for-
bearance is the least persistent state, since it is designed to temporarily 
help borrowers in need. Indeed, borrowers cannot typically receive a 
deferment or forbearance indefi nitely. In the end, most borrowers who 
receive this form of assistance return to repayment; however, one in six 
end up defaulting.
Finally, the B&B asked respondents about their earnings in the 
1997 and 2003 surveys; we also use these data. The 1997 survey asked 
respondents about their annual salaries for the jobs they were working 
during April of that year, while the 2003 survey asked respondents about 
their total income from work earned in 2002. Based on these questions, 
respondents in our sample (borrowers and nonborrowers alike) reported 
average earnings of roughly $30,000 in 1997 and $50,000 in 2002. 
DETERMINANTS OF STUDENT BORROWING
AND REPAYMENT
In this section, we study the determinants of undergraduate bor-
rowing and repayment behavior measured in 2003, roughly 10 years 
after graduation. Since the standard repayment plan for Stafford Loans 
is based on a 10-year repayment period, students who were always 
in good standing and making the standard payment should have paid 
down most, if not all, of their loans. As we show, many did not. In 
addition to studying the fraction of debt students repaid within the fi rst 
10 years after school, we also examine the traditional metric used to 
study student loan repayment behavior: default.9 We then extend this 
metric to include borrowers in deferment or forbearance and report on 
the fraction of undergraduate debts remaining for borrowers who have 
defaulted or are in nonpayment more generally.
We begin with an analysis of average postschool earnings, under-
graduate borrowing, and repayment/nonpayment rates by student char-
acteristics. We then explore differences in these outcomes based on the 
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types of institutions from which students graduated. Finally, we use 
standard multivariate regression methods to examine the importance 
of individual/family and institutional factors, along with college major, 
student borrowing, and postschool earnings levels in determining stu-
dent loan repayment, default, and other measures of nonpayment. This 
enables us to identify which factors are most important while simulta-
neously controlling for other potentially important factors.
Differences by Borrower Characteristics
Table 8.3 characterizes the postschool labor market outcomes, 
undergraduate borrowing, and repayment outcomes across different 
types of students defi ned by gender, race/ethnicity, SAT/ACT quar-
tiles, and maternal education. Because we are primarily interested in 
repayment/nonpayment, this table focuses on our sample of borrowers 
only. Before discussing repayment, we briefl y comment on differences 
in earnings and undergraduate borrowing across groups as reported in 
columns (2) and (3).
Column (2) reveals a large difference in earnings (including 
incomes of zero for the nonemployed) between men and women, while 
differences by race/ethnicity, student aptitude, and family background 
are more modest. Male college graduates earn about 70 percent more 
than female graduates 10 years after fi nishing school. Blacks earn about 
15 percent less than whites, while Asians earn about 15 percent more. 
Hispanics had earnings similar to whites in our sample of borrowers. 
Earnings increase over SAT/ACT quartiles 1–3; however, earnings for 
the top quartile are very similar to those in the second quartile (nearly 
20 percent less than the third quartile). This seemingly perverse pattern 
at the top is largely due to our sample selection criteria, which exclude 
those who attended 12 or more months of graduate school (by 1997) or 
received a graduate degree. This restriction disproportionately affects 
the top aptitude quartile, and removing it yields very similar average 
income levels for the top two quartiles (see Table 8A.2). Differences in 
earnings based on maternal education are relatively modest, although 
those with mothers who received a BA/BS degree earned almost $9,000 
more than those whose mothers did not attend college.
Column (3) in Table 8.3 reveals very small differences in aver-
age undergraduate loan amounts compared across gender and SAT/
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ACT quartiles. Differences by race/ethnicity and maternal background 
are more pronounced, though still modest. In considering race/ethnic-
ity, Hispanics borrowed the least, at $8,100, while whites borrowed 
the most, at about $1,300 more. Students whose mothers fi nished col-
lege borrowed nearly $1,200 more than students whose mothers never 
attended college. These two patterns suggest that whites and borrow-
ers from higher socioeconomic families are attending more expensive 
institutions, on average.
The remaining columns in Table 8.3 focus on repayment and non-
payment of student loans. Column (4) shows the average fraction of 
undergraduate loan amounts still outstanding in 2003. This provides a 
useful measure of returns to lenders within the fi rst 10 years. As noted 
earlier, borrowers who make standard payments every month should 
owe very little (or nothing) on their undergraduate loans by this time. A 
high value here indicates low payment levels or periods of nonpayment. 
As the fi rst row in Table 8.3 shows, of the $9,300 initially borrowed, 
students still owed 19 percent, on average, 10 years later. Column (5) 
reports the fraction of borrowers in default, while column (6) reports a 
broader measure of nonpayment that includes borrowers in deferment, 
forbearance, or default. In our sample, 5.8 percent of all borrowers were 
in default 10 years after fi nishing college, while 8.3 percent were not 
making payments for various reasons (i.e., deferment, forbearance, or 
default). Finally, columns (7) and (8) report the average share of under-
graduate loan amounts currently in default or currently not being repaid 
because of deferment, forbearance, or default.10 If borrowers in default 
or nonpayment 10 years after leaving school are very unlikely to return 
to good standing, these fi gures suggest that the expected loan loss rate 
(for a typical borrower) faced by lenders is around 2.8 percent (based on 
defaults), or as high as 5.2 percent (based on any nonpayment). These 
amounts are notably lower than default/nonpayment rates themselves 
(columns [5] and [6]) because many defaulters (nonpayers) repay some 
of their student debts before entering default (nonpayment).
Now, consider differences in repayment and nonpayment patterns 
by gender as reported in Table 8.3. Consistent with signifi cantly lower 
postschool earnings, women owe more on their loans than men 10 years 
after fi nishing college (22 percent vs. 15 percent) and have higher rates 
of nonpayment (9.5 percent versus 6.7 percent). The fraction of debt in 
nonpayment was also 2.5 times higher for women than for men. Yet, 
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Not paying × 
share of debt
still owed
Full sample 2,120 49.629 9.336 0.188 0.058 0.083 0.028 0.052
(1.300) (0.179) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007)
Males 900 64.199 9.646 0.146 0.057 0.067 0.019 0.028
(2.426) (0.304) (0.014) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Females 1,210 37.705 9.091 0.221 0.059 0.095 0.034 0.071
(1.097) (0.212) (0.018) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013)
Asians 50 58.085 8.706 0.236 0.112 0.130 0.020 0.026
(3.975) (1.039) (0.075) (0.043) (0.047) (0.013) (0.015)
Blacks 150 42.123 9.165 0.506 0.132 0.180 0.156 0.208
(2.513) (0.522) (0.064) (0.029) (0.032) (0.057) (0.060)
Hispanics 130 47.235 8.127 0.216 0.113 0.134 0.031 0.048
(3.115) (0.786) (0.054) (0.038) (0.041) (0.011) (0.020)
Whites 1,780 49.965 9.441 0.158 0.047 0.070 0.017 0.040
(1.483) (0.197) (0.012) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) (0.007)
SAT/ACT Q1 510 41.641 9.466 0.236 0.061 0.097 0.032 0.059
(1.641) (0.460) (0.025) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011)
SAT/ACT Q2 500 50.197 9.153 0.141 0.048 0.054 0.022 0.025
(2.164) (0.319) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.007)
SAT/ACT Q3 480 60.087 9.673 0.175 0.047 0.076 0.010 0.026
(3.914) (0.371) (0.031) (0.009) (0.014) (0.004) (0.007)
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SAT/ACT Q4 370 50.540 9.131 0.151 0.061 0.084 0.027 0.052
(2.508) (0.378) (0.022) (0.012) (0.014) (0.009) (0.014)
Mother no 
college
920 48.168 8.911 0.223 0.060 0.088 0.027 0.058
(1.726) (0.240) (0.021) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.012)
Mother some 
college
610 44.452 9.184 0.140 0.055 0.069 0.028 0.039
(1.960) (0.297) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.009)
Mother BA+ 580 56.838 10.161 0.180 0.058 0.089 0.028 0.055
(3.177) (0.416) (0.021) (0.010) (0.014) (0.013) (0.016)
NOTE: The table shows sample means based on the B&B sample of borrowers. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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these differences are not apparent when comparing default rates, which 
are nearly identical for men and women. Even with similar default 
rates, women have defaulted on 80 percent more debt than men. These 
fi gures highlight the value of considering alternative measures of repay-
ment and nonpayment beyond traditionally used default rates. Despite 
very similar default rates between male and female student borrow-
ers, lenders can expect faster payments and a higher recovery rate from 
male students.
Differences in repayment behavior are much more pronounced 
by race/ethnicity than by gender, with particularly stark differences 
between blacks and whites. On average, black borrowers still owe 51 
percent of their student loans 10 years after college, while white bor-
rowers owe only 16 percent. Hispanics and Asians owe 22 percent and 
24 percent, respectively. Black borrowers have defaulted on 16 percent 
of their undergraduate debt and are in nonpayment on 21 percent. By 
contrast, the next highest rates of nonpayment are for Hispanics, who 
have defaulted on only 3.1 percent of their debt and are in nonpayment 
on 4.8 percent. Given these dramatic differences, it is interesting to note 
that default rates are quite similar for all three minority groups (13 per-
cent for blacks, 11 percent for Hispanics and Asians), while they are 
much lower for whites (less than 5 percent). There are larger differences 
between blacks and the other minority groups for nonpayment rates 
that include deferment and forbearance (18 percent for blacks versus 13 
percent for Hispanics and Asians). Once again, important differences in 
repayment and expected loan losses by lenders are obscured by focus-
ing exclusively on default rates. It is also worth noting that the racial/
ethnic differences in repayment/nonpayment outcomes are unlikely to 
be driven by differences in borrowing or postschool earnings, which are 
quite modest. We explore this issue further below.
The share of undergraduate debt remaining 10 years after gradu-
ation is highest for students with the lowest SAT/ACT scores (24 per-
cent for the lowest quartile, and 14–18 percent for all other quartiles). 
All default and nonpayment outcomes show an interesting U-shaped 
pattern in achievement that is roughly consistent with the inverted 
U-shaped pattern for earnings. Default and nonpayment rates are as 
high as 6 percent and 10 percent, respectively, for the lowest SAT/ACT 
group; they then fall to around 5 percent for the second and third quar-
tiles before returning to higher levels for the top ability group. A simi-
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lar, though weaker, pattern is evident for the share of debt in default or 
nonpayment. Unlike the relationship for earnings, the surprising non-
monotonic relationship between achievement and default/nonpayment 
is not a consequence of our sample restriction that excludes those with 
graduate degrees or 12 or more months of graduate school. A similar 
pattern arises even when we do not impose this restriction. Indeed, the 
fraction of debts in default or nonpayment is actually highest for the top 
SAT/ACT quartile in the unrestricted sample (see Table 8A.2).
The last three rows in Table 8.3 show that socioeconomic status, as 
measured by maternal education, is only weakly and statistically insig-
nifi cantly related to default and nonpayment.11
By contrast, the fraction of debt repaid after 10 years is signifi cantly 
higher for borrowers whose mothers attended college. Students with 
stronger socioeconomic backgrounds appear to reduce their loan bal-
ances more quickly; however, they do not appear to be any less likely to 
enter default, deferment, or forbearance.
Differences by Institutional Characteristics
We next explore differences in borrowing and repayment/nonpay-
ment patterns, categorizing individuals based on the type of institution 
from which they graduated. Table 8.4 shows differences by institutional 
control (public, private not-for-profi t, and private for-profi t), and by col-
lege selectivity as determined by Barron’s. Given the high nonpayment 
rates for black college graduates reported in Table 8.3, we also exam-
ine outcomes for blacks graduating from historically black colleges and 
universities (HBCU) versus those from traditional non-HBCU institu-
tions. Table 8.4, like Table 8.3, is based on our sample of borrowers.
There is considerable interest today in the high default rates at pri-
vate for-profi t institutions. There is also concern about the high debt 
levels associated with attendance at private institutions more generally. 
The fi rst few rows of Table 8.4 offer more detailed evidence on these 
issues from 1992–1993 graduates 10 years after school. Postschool 
earnings are quite similar across graduates from public and private for-
profi t and nonprofi t institutions; however, student debt levels are highest 
for graduates of nonprofi t institutions ($11,200), followed by for-profi t 
institutions ($9,700) and public institutions ($8,400). Unfortunately, the 
sample size for for-profi t institutions is quite small (33), making it dif-
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share of debt 
still owed
(8)
Not paying × 
share of debt 
still owed
Public 1,350 49.458 8.407 0.174 0.056 0.076 0.025 0.047
(1.630) (0.224) (0.015) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
Private nonprofi t 720 49.827 11.207 0.213 0.054 0.086 0.032 0.061
(2.268) (0.297) (0.021) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
Private for-profi t 30 51.434 9.738 0.199 0.182 0.264 0.059 0.087
(7.896) (1.263) (0.073) (0.091) (0.108) (0.042) (0.047)
Most competitive 150 61.583 11.453 0.202 0.043 0.087 0.009 0.043
(4.663) (0.650) (0.034) (0.016) (0.022) (0.005) (0.014)
Competitive 1,300 49.990 9.471 0.168 0.054 0.075 0.026 0.041
(1.558) (0.235) (0.013) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
Noncompetitive 620 46.041 8.668 0.230 0.065 0.096 0.034 0.076
(2.696) (0.308) (0.026) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.021)
Black, not HBCU 100 44.421 10.085 0.448 0.170 0.223 0.157 0.203
(3.088) (0.667) (0.054) (0.042) (0.045) (0.045) (0.048)
Black, HBCU 50 38.850 7.855 0.589 0.078 0.119 0.155 0.215
(4.075) (0.837) (0.132) (0.033) (0.041) (0.124) (0.129)
NOTE: The table shows sample means based on the B&B sample of borrowers. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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fi cult to draw strong conclusions about borrowing and repayment/non-
payment rates for this group; note the large standard errors across the 
table for this institution type. On average, the fraction of debt still owed 
is slightly lower for public school graduates, but the differences across 
institution types are statistically insignifi cant. Default and nonpayment 
rates are very similar for public school graduates and nonprofi t gradu-
ates, but they are three to four times higher (18 percent and 26 percent, 
respectively) for for-profi t graduates. Unfortunately, because of small 
sample sizes, we cannot statistically distinguish across the groups. The 
extremely high default/nonpayment rates for for-profi t graduates do not 
appear to translate into much higher shares of debt in default/nonpay-
ment as observed in the last two columns.
Our next set of results compares students based on Barron’s rank-
ings of institutional selectivity. Earnings and debt levels are both nota-
bly higher among students from the most competitive institutions. Dif-
ferences in repayment, default, and nonpayment measures across school 
selectivity are quite modest and generally not statistically signifi cant. As 
might be expected, default and nonpayment rates are generally lowest 
for graduates of the most competitive institutions; however, they do not 
have the lowest share of debt still owed. In general, these differences 
are not statistically signifi cant. There is little evidence to suggest that 
institutional selectivity is a particularly important determinant of repay-
ment and nonpayment; however, we examine below whether important 
differences are confounded by other systematic differences in the char-
acteristics and choices of individuals attending these institutions.
Finally, the bottom of Table 8.4 compares the outcomes for blacks 
attending HBCU and non-HBCU institutions. Small sample sizes are 
a problem here, as with for-profi t institutions, yet a few patterns are 
worth noting. While earnings of HBCU graduates are similar to those of 
black graduates from non-HBCUs, HBCU graduates leave school with 
signifi cantly lower debt. The most notable differences between HBCU 
and non-HBCU graduates, however, are for default and nonpayment. 
Blacks from HBCUs have default (nonpayment) rates of 8 percent (12 
percent) compared with roughly twice those rates for non-HBCU grad-
uates. Despite these sizable differences, the fraction of debt in default 
or nonpayment is remarkably similar (16 percent and 20–21 percent, 
respectively).
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A Multivariate Analysis of Student Loan Repayment
As Tables 8.3 and 8.4 show, many important dimensions of het-
erogeneity across college graduates may affect repayment behavior. 
Therefore, it is important to simultaneously account for all of these fac-
tors before drawing strong conclusions about which are most important 
and why. We use standard multivariate regression methods to do this. 
These methods can be helpful in sorting out questions such as the fol-
lowing: Are default rates so high among blacks because they attend dif-
ferent types of schools than whites? Or because their SAT/ACT scores 
are lower? Or because their mothers are less educated? Do differences 
in repayment or nonpayment across institution types simply refl ect the 
students they attract?
Before exploring repayment and nonpayment outcomes, we begin 
by examining which factors determine how much a student borrows 
(based on our full sample of borrowers and nonborrowers). Table 8.5 
shows the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression estimates for total 
undergraduate loan amounts (in thousands of dollars) as a function of 
individual characteristics, college major, institutional characteristics, 
and state fi xed effects based on the institutions from which students 
graduated.12 Column (1) includes only demographic characteristics: 
gender, race/ethnicity, SAT/ACT quartile, maternal education, depen-
dency status (for fi nancial aid purposes), and parental income (in thou-
sands of dollars) interacted with dependency status.13 This specifi ca-
tion is useful for measuring the full impact of these individual/family 
characteristics on borrowing (and repayment/nonpayment outcomes 
examined in subsequent tables) and incorporates any effects coming 
through choice of major or institution of attendance. Column (2) con-
trols for the same background characteristics, as well as college major 
(all other majors not specifi cally listed refl ect the omitted category), 
while column (3) includes controls for background characteristics and 
institution characteristics (e.g., type of control and Barron’s selectivity). 
Column (4) includes all three types of variables: background, college 
major, and institutional characteristics. Comparing estimated effects of 
background characteristics across columns (1) versus (2) through (4) is 
informative about the extent to which individual characteristics affect 
borrowing through the choice of college major or institution. Column 
(5) adds state fi xed effects to the specifi cation in column (4), accounting 
up15bhslatch8.indd   250 2/17/2015   9:34:29 AM
Default and Repayment among Baccalaureate Degree Earners   251
for any unobserved differences in policies, educational institutions, and 
labor markets that vary across states. Similar specifi cations are used to 
study repayment, default, and more general measures of nonpayment 
below.
Several individual and family characteristics are important determi-
nants of borrowing. Black students borrow signifi cantly more than all 
other racial/ethnic groups. Columns (1) and (2) suggest that black grad-
uates borrow nearly $2,000 more than whites. Accounting for choice 
of major, this difference grows even larger, suggesting that blacks tend 
to choose majors that are not typically associated with extensive bor-
rowing. We also estimate higher levels of borrowing for students with 
better SAT/ACT scores. Comparing columns (1) and (4) suggests that 
much of this difference is explained by choice of major and institu-
tion: Higher-scoring students are inclined to attend schools and to 
choose majors associated with greater borrowing. Table 8.3 shows that 
students whose mothers have college education tend to borrow more. 
Regression results in Table 8.5 show that the opposite is true once we 
account for other personal differences, especially race, achievement, 
and parental income. Accounting for these other factors, students whose 
mothers received their BA/BS borrow roughly $1,500 less than those 
whose mothers did not attend college. The estimates also suggest that a 
$10,000 increase in parental earnings is associated with about $250 less 
in borrowing. We fi nd no evidence to suggest that differences in bor-
rowing by maternal education or parental income are due to differential 
choices regarding major and institution.
Some majors appear to be associated with greater borrowing—engi-
neering, health-related majors, history, and especially biology—though 
not necessarily with high-paying professions. Institutional characteris-
tics also appear to be important determinants of borrowing. Students 
graduating from private (for-profi t or nonprofi t) institutions tend to bor-
row about $3,000 more than those attending public institutions, all else 
equal. Black students attending HBCUs tend to borrow $1,500–$2,000 
less than blacks attending other institutions. Less-competitive institu-
tions are associated with about $600–$700 less in borrowing, although 
these differences are not statistically signifi cant at the 0.05 level.
Altogether, many factors affect undergraduate borrowing; however, 
differences across individuals, college majors, and institutions are gen-
erally modest. Tables 8.6–8.10 show the extent to which these same 
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Table 8.5  Explaining Total Undergraduate Student Loan Amounts
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Male 0.086 0.046 0.192 0.139 0.096
(0.211) (0.222) (0.208) (0.218) (0.215)
Black 1.875** 1.843** 2.559** 2.460** 2.803**
(0.486) (0.486) (0.559) (0.557) (0.549)
Hispanic 0.670 0.744 0.695 0.733 1.561**
(0.523) (0.521) (0.520) (0.518) (0.551)
Asian −0.626 −0.767 −0.499 −0.673 −0.079
(0.609) (0.609) (0.600) (0.600) (0.616)
SAT/ACT Q2 0.254 0.110 0.215 0.089 0.139
(0.282) (0.282) (0.278) (0.278) (0.273)
SAT/ACT Q3 0.723** 0.545 0.588** 0.413 0.348
(0.293) (0.296) (0.291) (0.294) (0.290)
SAT/ACT Q4 1.076** 0.749** 0.639** 0.312 0.195
(0.318) (0.325) (0.322) (0.328) (0.324)
Mother some college −0.641** −0.608** −0.625** −0.580** −0.310
(0.263) (0.262) (0.259) (0.257) (0.254)
Mother BA+ −1.447** −1.402** −1.607** −1.525** −1.445**
(0.247) (0.246) (0.244) (0.243) (0.240)
Dependent −0.131 −0.041 −0.376 −0.291 −0.643**
(0.270) (0.269) (0.266) (0.265) (0.265)
Parental income −0.025** −0.025** −0.026** −0.026** −0.023**
× dependent (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Business 0.004 −0.075 −0.184
(0.374) (0.368) (0.360)
Education 0.436 0.306 0.215
(0.375) (0.368) (0.363)
Engineering 1.263** 1.445** 1.228**
(0.467) (0.460) (0.453)
Health 1.904** 1.953** 1.755**
(0.459) (0.451) (0.447)
Public affairs −0.402 −0.588 −0.893
(0.603) (0.592) (0.584)
Biology 3.189** 2.897** 2.951**
(0.532) (0.527) (0.523)
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Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Math/science 0.318 0.321 0.447
(0.488) (0.482) (0.476)
Social science 0.453 0.340 0.112
(0.407) (0.400) (0.395)
History 1.618** 1.008 1.195
(0.797) (0.779) (0.767)
Humanities 0.440 0.013 −0.031
(0.408) (0.403) (0.396)
Psychology −0.072 0.122 0.330
(0.609) (0.596) (0.588)
Private for-profi t 2.798** 3.049** 3.036**
(1.045) (1.039) (1.023)
Private nonprofi t 3.075** 3.089** 2.656**
(0.226) (0.225) (0.235)
HBCU −2.128** −1.945** −1.552
(0.909) (0.907) (0.906)
Competitive −0.657 −0.565 −0.675
(0.385) (0.384) (0.397)
Noncompetitive −0.651 −0.567 −0.720
(0.427) (0.426) (0.440)
State fi xed effects No No No No Yes
N 3,750 3,750 3,700 3,690 3,690
R2 0.062 0.077 0.113 0.128 0.183
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. Estimates based on the sample of B&B 
borrowers and nonborrowers. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Table 8.5  (continued)
factors affect repayment and nonpayment behavior for our sample of 
borrowers only. All of these tables have the same structure, which is 
very similar to that of Table 8.5. Indeed, the specifi cations in columns 
(1)–(4) are the same as in Table 8.5. These specifi cations are informa-
tive about the importance of characteristics and choices known ex ante 
(i.e., when lenders decide how much to lend to students). It is also use-
ful to consider the extent to which ex post borrowing and earnings lev-
els affect repayment/nonpayment outcomes conditional on these other 
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factors, as well as the extent to which background, college major, and 
institutional characteristics affect repayment/nonpayment through bor-
rowing and earnings levels. To explore these issues, column (5) adds 
measures of earnings in 1997, earnings in 2002, and the total amount 
borrowed for undergraduate schooling (all in $000s) to the background, 
college major, and institutional characteristics of column (4). Column 
(6) also includes state fi xed effects.
In Table 8.6, we consider the share of undergraduate debt still owed 
10 years after graduation. These OLS regressions produce a number of 
interesting results. First, column (1) shows that, conditional on other 
background characteristics, the share of debt owed by men was almost 
5 percentage points less than the share owed by women. About one-
quarter of this difference is explained by choice of college major (see 
column [2]) and another half by differences in postschool earnings (see 
column [5] and recall that initial borrowing amounts were the same for 
men and women as shown in Table 8.5). Most strikingly, the share of 
debt still owed was 22–27 percentage points higher for blacks than for 
whites. While this gap is smaller than the unconditional gap in Table 
8.3, it is still statistically and economically quite signifi cant. Compar-
ing columns (1)–(5) suggests that very little of this gap is explained by 
choice of major, institution, loan amounts, or postschool earnings. His-
panics owe a slightly larger share of their debt than do whites; however, 
half of the effect disappears when accounting for state fi xed effects. 
Accounting for other individual characteristics eliminates the raw dif-
ferences by SAT/ACT scores in the fraction of debt still owed. We also 
observe no differences by dependency status or parental income. Stu-
dents whose mothers graduated or obtained postgraduate degrees owe 
4–7 percentage points less as a fraction of their initial loan when com-
pared with students whose mothers never attended college.
Engineering majors reduce their loans more within the fi rst 10 years 
after graduating, owing 10 percentage points less as a share of their 
initial loan (compared with “other” majors). Column (5) in Table 8.6 
suggests that this is not explained by differences in borrowing or post-
school earnings.
Accounting for earnings and borrowing levels (and state fi xed 
effects), social science and humanities majors appear to owe about 8 
percentage points more (than “other” majors) as a share of their original 
loan amounts. Institutional characteristics do not play an important role 
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in determining repayment rates after accounting for loan amounts and 
postschool earnings.
As might be expected, both earnings and loan levels are important 
determinants of the share of debt repaid. Students with higher earnings 
in 1997 had repaid a greater fraction of their debt (roughly 1.2 per-
centage points for every $10,000 in earnings), while those with higher 
student debt levels had repaid a lower fraction (roughly 1.3 percent-
age points for every additional $1,000 in debt). It is also worth noting 
that the R-squared values (reported at the bottom of the table) suggest 
that debt levels and postschool earnings account for about 7 percent 
of the variation in the share of debt owed, as much as individual back-
ground characteristics, college major, and institutional characteristics 
combined (compare columns [4] and [5]).
We now turn to measures of nonpayment. Tables 8.7 and 8.8 show 
average marginal effects from probit specifi cations for default and our 
broader measure of nonpayment that also includes deferment/forbear-
ance. There is considerable agreement for both of these outcomes, so 
we discuss them together. Both blacks and Asians have signifi cantly 
higher default and nonpayment rates than whites (differences are about 
6–9 percentage points), with slightly greater differences observed for 
the broader measure of nonpayment.14 Default/nonpayment rates are 
quite similar for whites and Hispanics. The estimated effects of race/
ethnicity are similar across all specifi cations, suggesting that racial 
and ethnic differences in default and nonpayment rates are not driven 
by differences in choice of major or institution, student debt levels, or 
even postschool earnings realizations. Parental income for dependent 
students reduces default and nonpayment, but the effects are small in 
magnitude (e.g., an additional $10,000 in income lowers the probabil-
ity of default by less than 0.01) and drop by half when accounting for 
borrowing and postschool income levels. Before accounting for loan 
amounts and postschool income (column [4]), we see that business 
majors are signifi cantly less likely to experience default/nonpayment, 
while history and math/science majors are more likely to experience 
these problems. Perhaps surprisingly, the estimated effects of college 
major are not much different after accounting for student borrowing 
and postschool earnings (compare columns [4] and [5]). None of the 
institutional characteristics appear to infl uence default/nonpayment 
once individual background characteristics are accounted for. Finally, 
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Table 8.6  Explaining Fraction of Undergraduate Student Debt Still Owed 10 Years after Graduation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male −0.0467** −0.0341 −0.0471** −0.0344 −0.0170 −0.0194
(0.0168) (0.0177) (0.0169) (0.0178) (0.0189) (0.0190)
Black 0.2710** 0.2720** 0.2560** 0.2510** 0.2440** 0.2160**
(0.0329) (0.0332) (0.0391) (0.0393) (0.0390) (0.0396)
Hispanic 0.0610 0.0602 0.0681 0.0669 0.0675 0.0347
(0.0358) (0.0360) (0.0366) (0.0367) (0.0369) (0.0411)
Asian 0.0697 0.0621 0.0659 0.0598 0.0616 0.1070
(0.0547) (0.0546) (0.0555) (0.0554) (0.0594) (0.0615)
SAT/ACT Q2 −0.0000 0.0013 0.0017 0.0032 0.0088 0.0056
(0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0228) (0.0228) (0.0236) (0.0236)
SAT/ACT Q3 0.0046 0.0112 0.0056 0.0129 0.0179 0.0235
(0.0233) (0.0238) (0.0238) (0.0242) (0.0249) (0.0252)
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0143 0.0187 0.0093 0.0146 0.0228 0.0289
(0.0252) (0.0260) (0.0259) (0.0266) (0.0272) (0.0276)
Mother some college −0.0556** −0.0573** −0.0557** −0.0573** −0.0449** −0.0467**
(0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0204) (0.0205)
Mother BA+ −0.0596** −0.0659** −0.0655** −0.0724** −0.0550** −0.0616**
(0.0201) (0.0202) (0.0204) (0.0205) (0.0210) (0.0213)
Dependent −0.0073 −0.0079 −0.0129 −0.0132 −0.0190 −0.0094
(0.0221) (0.0223) (0.0224) (0.0226) (0.0230) (0.0237)
Parental income 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 0.0004 0.0004
× dependent (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
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Business −0.0475 −0.0488 −0.0199 −0.0200
(0.0314) (0.0317) (0.0321) (0.0320)
Education −0.0333 −0.0356 −0.0437 −0.0411
(0.0304) (0.0306) (0.0317) (0.0320)
Engineering −0.1040** −0.1090** −0.0856** −0.0896**
(0.0359) (0.0365) (0.0375) (0.0378)
Health −0.0127 −0.0167 −0.0040 −0.0073
(0.0363) (0.0365) (0.0376) (0.0380)
Public affairs −0.0368 −0.0404 −0.0165 0.0022
(0.0504) (0.0507) (0.0507) (0.0509)
Biology 0.0052 0.0036 −0.0225 −0.0502
(0.0402) (0.0407) (0.0407) (0.0420)
Math/science −0.0259 −0.0254 −0.0189 −0.0589
(0.0380) (0.0387) (0.0403) (0.0409)
Social science 0.0390 0.0397 0.0577 0.0783**
(0.0336) (0.0340) (0.0345) (0.0351)
History 0.0216 0.0119 0.0186 0.0236
(0.0606) (0.0607) (0.0604) (0.0610)
Humanities 0.0559 0.0600 0.0742** 0.0826**
(0.0336) (0.0342) (0.0352) (0.0353)
Psychology 0.0482 0.0494 0.0666 0.0610
(0.0484) (0.0486) (0.0512) (0.0514)
Private for-profi t −0.0411 −0.0491 −0.0832 −0.0656
(0.0781) (0.0780) (0.0888) (0.0890)
(continued)
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258   Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private nonprofi t 0.0520** 0.0474** −0.0000 0.0044
(0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0187) (0.0197)
HBCU 0.0416 0.0611 0.0488 0.0409
(0.0649) (0.0653) (0.0665) (0.0686)
Competitive −0.0115 −0.0090 0.0111 −0.0126
(0.0320) (0.0322) (0.0327) (0.0344)
Noncompetitive −0.0046 −0.0003 0.0203 −0.0118
(0.0350) (0.0353) (0.0359) (0.0378)
1997 earnings −0.0012** −0.0011**
($000s) (0.0005) (0.0005)
2002 earnings −0.0004 −0.0004
($000s) (0.0003) (0.0003)
UG loan amount 0.0130** 0.0133**
($000s) (0.0012) (0.0012)
State fi xed effects No No No No No Yes
N 1,850 1,850 1,820 1,820 1,610 1,610
R2 0.0507 0.0653 0.0562 0.0717 0.1410 0.1910
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table shows coeffi cient estimates based on OLS regressions for the fraction of student 
loan debt still owed in 2003. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Table 8.6  (continued)
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we observe sizable and statistically signifi cant effects of student bor-
rowing levels and postschool earnings. An extra $10,000 in earnings 
in 2002 is associated with a roughly 0.8 (1.2) percentage-point drop in 
the probability of default (nonpayment), while an additional $1,000 in 
student loans increases the likelihood of default (nonpayment) by 0.3 
(0.4) percentage points.
Finally, we consider the extent to which these factors affect the 
share of undergraduate debt on which borrowers have defaulted or are 
not currently paying (10 years after graduating). Tables 8.9 and 8.10 
show results from OLS regressions for these two dependent variables. 
Here, we fi nd that compared with whites, blacks default on 11–13 per-
cent more of their debt and are in nonpayment on about 13–16 percent 
more of their debt. Despite similarly high default and nonpayment rates 
for Asians and blacks (Tables 8.7 and 8.8), Asians neither default on nor 
are in nonpayment on a larger fraction of their debts relative to whites 
and Hispanics. These fi ndings suggest that blacks enter nonpayment 
relatively early in the repayment process, while Asians enter relatively 
late after much of their debt has been repaid. The effects of race/ethnic-
ity on the share of debts in default/nonpayment are not driven by major, 
institution choices, differences in debt levels, or postschool earnings. 
The fi nal two rows of Table 8.10 suggest that after accounting for earn-
ings and borrowing differences, students from the top SAT/ACT quar-
tile are in nonpayment on a greater fraction of their undergraduate debt 
(about 4 percentage points more) than all other achievement groups. 
Other individual/family characteristics have little impact on the fraction 
of debt in default/nonpayment. Choice of college major also appears 
to have only minor (and generally statistically insignifi cant at the 0.05 
level) effects on the share of debt in default/nonpayment; however, the 
estimates in the fi nal two columns suggest that health majors default on 
a signifi cantly smaller fraction, while humanities majors are in nonpay-
ment on a signifi cantly higher fraction. Institutional control and college 
selectivity are unrelated to the share of debts in default/nonpayment; 
however, black borrowers attending HBCUs appear to stop paying and 
default on a signifi cantly lower fraction of their debt than otherwise 
similar black borrowers who attend non-HBCUs. As with the probabil-
ity of default and nonpayment, higher earnings reduce the share of debt 
on which individuals default or stop paying, while higher debt levels 
increase the share. Contrary to the case with default and nonpayment, 
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Table 8.7  Explaining Default 10 Years after Graduation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male −0.0023 −0.0058 −0.0058 −0.0089 −0.0001 0.0005
(0.0118) (0.0124) (0.0119) (0.0125) (0.0137) (0.0137)
Black 0.0733** 0.0687** 0.0804** 0.0732** 0.0665** 0.0554**
(0.0190) (0.0189) (0.0219) (0.0217) (0.0223) (0.0222)
Hispanic 0.0194 0.0184 0.0216 0.0191 0.0317 0.0267
(0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0232) (0.0233)
Asian 0.0709** 0.0704** 0.0750** 0.0745** 0.0734** 0.0718**
(0.0293) (0.0292) (0.0295) (0.0292) (0.0323) (0.0326)
SAT/ACT Q2 −0.0040 −0.0125 −0.0071 −0.0163 −0.0071 −0.0087
(0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0165) (0.0165)
SAT/ACT Q3 −0.0079 −0.0146 −0.0074 −0.0133 −0.0175 −0.0150
(0.0167) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0169) (0.0180) (0.0179)
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0185 0.0052 0.0206 0.0073 0.0056 0.0061
(0.0171) (0.0175) (0.0173) (0.0176) (0.0184) (0.0184)
Mother some college 0.0104 0.0119 0.0126 0.0143 0.0177 0.0225
(0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0142)
Mother BA+ 0.0182 0.0149 0.0180 0.0139 0.0064 0.0029
(0.0140) (0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0141) (0.0151) (0.0151)
Dependent −0.0040 −0.0132 −0.0012 −0.0122 −0.0152 −0.0170
(0.0182) (0.0185) (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0191) (0.0191)
Parental income −0.0010** −0.0008** −0.0010** −0.0008** −0.0005 −0.0004
× dependent (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
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Business −0.0765** −0.0748** −0.0831** −0.0810**
(0.0281) (0.0279) (0.0310) (0.0310)
Education −0.0239 −0.0240 −0.0321 −0.0256
(0.0212) (0.0210) (0.0213) (0.0212)
Engineering −0.0224 −0.0369 −0.0226 −0.0177
(0.0257) (0.0275) (0.0291) (0.0289)
Health −0.0183 −0.0254 −0.0376 −0.0475
(0.0250) (0.0253) (0.0267) (0.0268)
Public affairs −0.0127 −0.0137 −0.0168 −0.0171
(0.0339) (0.0336) (0.0328) (0.0328)
Biology 0.0125 0.0140 0.0062 0.0089
(0.0249) (0.0249) (0.0246) (0.0245)
Math/science 0.0451** 0.0478** 0.0380 0.0329
(0.0225) (0.0225) (0.0240) (0.0241)
Social science −0.0310 −0.0288 −0.0321 −0.0221
(0.0242) (0.0240) (0.0244) (0.0241)
History 0.0681** 0.0678** 0.0491 0.0501
(0.0329) (0.0325) (0.0329) (0.0329)
Humanities −0.0010 −0.0008 −0.0031 0.0008
(0.0225) (0.0224) (0.0228) (0.0226)
Psychology 0.0001 −0.0016 −0.0673 −0.0657
(0.0318) (0.0315) (0.0430) (0.0435)
Private for-profi t −0.0110 −0.0156
(0.0590) (0.0607)
(continued)
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262   Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private nonprofi t 0.0085 0.0069 −0.0088 −0.0056
(0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0131) (0.0133)
HBCU −0.0331 −0.0281 −0.0099 −0.0049
(0.0373) (0.0373) (0.0371) (0.0376)
Competitive 0.0158 0.0145 0.0138 0.0117
(0.0240) (0.0234) (0.0251) (0.0249)
Noncompetitive 0.0167 0.0164 0.0274 0.0181
(0.0259) (0.0254) (0.0268) (0.0269)
1997 earnings −0.0003 −0.0001
($000s) (0.0004) (0.0004)
2002 earnings −0.0008** −0.0008**
($000s) (0.0003) (0.0003)
UG loan amount 0.0027** 0.0028**
($000s) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Division fi xed effects No No No No No Yes
N 1,870 1,870 1,840 1,840 1,610 1,610
Log likelihood −436.7 −421.4 −426.4 −410.0 −337.9 −328.0
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table shows average marginal effects based on probit specifi cations for default in 2003. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Table 8.7  (continued)
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earnings in 1997 (a few years after graduation) rather than in 2003 are 
most important here. This fi nding is not surprising because most indi-
viduals enter default/nonpayment in the fi rst few years after gradua-
tion. An extra $10,000 in 1997 earnings reduces the fraction of debt in 
nonpayment by about 0.4 percentage points, while an additional $1,000 
in undergraduate debt reduces this fraction by just over 0.3 percentage 
points.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Given the large number of specifi cations we consider for each out-
come, it is useful to briefl y summarize our fi ndings. Table 8.11 shows 
the estimates for all fi ve repayment/nonpayment outcomes based on our 
most general specifi cation (column [6] of Tables 8.6–8.10). To further 
focus on the factors that matter, only variables that are statistically sig-
nifi cant for at least one outcome are included.
Among the individual and family background characteristics, only 
race is consistently important for all measures of repayment/nonpay-
ment. Ten years after graduation, black borrowers owe 22 percent more 
on their loans, are 6 (9) percentage points more likely to be in default 
(nonpayment), have defaulted on 11 percent more loans, and are in 
nonpayment on roughly 16 percent more of their undergraduate debt 
compared with white borrowers. These striking differences are largely 
unaffected by controls for choice of college major, institution, or even 
student debt levels and postschool earnings. By contrast, the repay-
ment and nonpayment patterns of Hispanics are very similar to those of 
whites. Asians show high default/nonpayment rates (similar to blacks), 
but their shares of debt still owed or debt in default/nonpayment are not 
signifi cantly different from those of whites. This suggests that many 
Asians who enter default/nonpayment do so after repaying much of 
their student loan debt. Maternal college attendance is associated with a 
greater share of debt repaid after 10 years, while dependency status and 
parental income are largely unimportant for repayment/nonpayment 
after controlling for other factors.
The B&B data suggest some variation in repayment/nonpayment 
across college major choices; however, which majors are most “success-
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Table 8.8  Explaining Nonpayment (Default, Deferment, or Forbearance) 10 Years after Graduation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male −0.0170 −0.0197 −0.0212 −0.0235 −0.0049 −0.0027
(0.0139) (0.0145) (0.0140) (0.0146) (0.0155) (0.0155)
Black 0.0900** 0.0855** 0.0999** 0.0906** 0.0905** 0.0853**
(0.0224) (0.0224) (0.0259) (0.0257) (0.0246) (0.0247)
Hispanic 0.0070 0.0045 0.0108 0.0070 0.0269 0.0286
(0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0282) (0.0282) (0.0266) (0.0269)
Asian 0.0790** 0.0768** 0.0826** 0.0810** 0.0885** 0.0888**
(0.0364) (0.0362) (0.0368) (0.0364) (0.0372) (0.0377)
SAT/ACT Q2 −0.0178 −0.0249 −0.0210 −0.0287 −0.0257 −0.0265
(0.0184) (0.0183) (0.0187) (0.0186) (0.0187) (0.0187)
SAT/ACT Q3 −0.0150 −0.0189 −0.0157 −0.0188 −0.0191 −0.0182
(0.0194) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0197) (0.0197) (0.0197)
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0268 0.0114 0.0257 0.0106 0.0081 0.0062
(0.0196) (0.0202) (0.0200) (0.0205) (0.0203) (0.0202)
Mother some college −0.0025 −0.0009 −0.0004 0.0017 0.0008 0.0076
(0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0160) (0.0159) (0.0159)
Mother BA+ 0.0014 −0.0036 −0.0006 −0.0069 −0.0055 −0.0068
(0.0164) (0.0163) (0.0167) (0.0166) (0.0167) (0.0168)
Dependent 0.0324 0.0256 0.0340 0.0251 0.0126 0.0112
(0.0210) (0.0212) (0.0211) (0.0213) (0.0210) (0.0210)
Parental income −0.0014** −0.0013** −0.0015** −0.0013** −0.0008 −0.0007
× dependent (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
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Business −0.0709** −0.0702** −0.0522 −0.0507
(0.0292) (0.0293) (0.0294) (0.0294)
Education −0.0411 −0.0415 −0.0478 −0.0421
(0.0254) (0.0253) (0.0252) (0.0252)
Engineering −0.0315 −0.0480 −0.0262 −0.0211
(0.0310) (0.0329) (0.0349) (0.0348)
Health −0.0040 −0.0113 −0.0120 −0.0195
(0.0285) (0.0288) (0.0286) (0.0287)
Public affairs −0.0159 −0.0167 −0.0019 −0.0050
(0.0398) (0.0397) (0.0367) (0.0367)
Biology 0.0073 0.0060 −0.0004 −0.0014
(0.0304) (0.0305) (0.0292) (0.0293)
Math/science 0.0555** 0.0587** 0.0538 0.0480
(0.0272) (0.0273) (0.0281) (0.0283)
Social science −0.0302 −0.0282 −0.0252 −0.0136
(0.0280) (0.0279) (0.0275) (0.0273)
History 0.0868** 0.0847** 0.0653 0.0658
(0.0402) (0.0400) (0.0382) (0.0383)
Humanities 0.0141 0.0139 0.0184 0.0231
(0.0258) (0.0258) (0.0254) (0.0252)
Psychology 0.0416 0.0404 0.0097 0.0120
(0.0344) (0.0344) (0.0363) (0.0365)
Private for-profi t 0.0116 0.0154
(0.0620) (0.0611)
(continued)
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266   Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private nonprofi t 0.0201 0.0167 −0.0036 −0.0000
(0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0144) (0.0146)
HBCU −0.0465 −0.0322 −0.0438 −0.0399
(0.0445) (0.0442) (0.0434) (0.0443)
Competitive −0.0100 −0.0129 0.0033 −0.0020
(0.0255) (0.0251) (0.0265) (0.0265)
Noncompetitive −0.0071 −0.0094 0.0171 0.0043
(0.0279) (0.0277) (0.0286) (0.0289)
1997 earnings ($000s) −0.0005 −0.0003
(0.0005) (0.0005)
2002 earnings ($000s) −0.0012** −0.0012**
(0.0003) (0.0003)




Division fi xed effects No No No No No Yes
N 1,870 1,870 1,840 1,840 1,610 1,610
Log likelihood −555.1 −538.4 −543.4 −525.9 −404.7 −396.1
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table shows average marginal effects based on probit specifi cations for nonpayment in 
2003. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Table 8.8  (continued)
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ful” in terms of repayment of debt depends on the measure. Engineer-
ing majors owe a signifi cantly smaller share of their debts (than “other” 
majors) after 10 years, while social science and humanities majors owe 
a larger share. Humanities majors are also in nonpayment on the great-
est share of debt. Default rates are lowest for business majors, whereas 
health majors default on the lowest fraction of their debts (these are the 
only signifi cantly different coeffi cients). In most cases, differences in 
these repayment measures across majors are modest compared with dif-
ferences between blacks and whites.
Differences in repayment/nonpayment across the type of institu-
tional control or selectivity are always small and generally statistically 
insignifi cant for our sample of 1992–1993 graduates. Among black 
borrowers, those attending HBCUs tend to be in nonpayment on sig-
nifi cantly less debt (roughly 12 percent less); however, other repay-
ment/nonpayment measures show no statistically signifi cant effects of 
an HBCU. Unfortunately, low sample sizes and correspondingly high 
standard errors limit the conclusions we can draw from our analysis of 
HBCUs.
Student debt and postschool income levels are both statistically sig-
nifi cant determinants of all measures of repayment and nonpayment, 
although the estimated effects are modest (e.g., an extra $10,000 in 
2002 earnings reduces the probability of nonpayment by 1.2 percent-
age points and $1,000 in additional student debt raises the probability 
of nonpayment by 0.4 percentage points). For measures related to the 
fraction of student debt outstanding, earnings a few years after school 
are more important than earnings 10 years later when we measure 
repayment/nonpayment. The opposite is true when considering simple 
default/nonpayment rates.
SOME GENERAL LESSONS AND CONCLUSIONS
To the extent that government and private lenders care about 
expected returns on student loans they distribute, we show that analy-
ses of default rates at some arbitrary date offer an incomplete picture 
for several reasons. First, many borrowers who enter default eventu-
ally return to good standing. Second, borrowers enter default at differ-
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Table 8.9  Explaining Fraction of Student Loan Debt in Default 10 Years after Graduation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male −0.0107 −0.0105 −0.0117 −0.0124 −0.0060 −0.0058
(0.0083) (0.0088) (0.0084) (0.0090) (0.0010) (0.0102)
Black 0.1060** 0.1050** 0.1300** 0.1290** 0.1160** 0.1080**
(0.0163) (0.0165) (0.0195) (0.0196) (0.0205) (0.0212)
Hispanic 0.0248 0.0249 0.0262 0.0257 0.0297 0.0164
(0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0182) (0.0193) (0.0219)
Asian 0.0069 0.0028 0.0077 0.0039 0.0042 0.0031
(0.0273) (0.0273) (0.0278) (0.0277) (0.0315) (0.0330)
SAT/ACT Q2 0.0069 0.0052 0.0038 0.0018 0.0060 0.0086
(0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0125) (0.0126)
SAT/ACT Q3 0.0026 0.0008 0.0025 0.0004 0.0033 0.0062
(0.0116) (0.0118) (0.0118) (0.0120) (0.0132) (0.0135)
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0213 0.0163 0.0215 0.0157 0.0192 0.0216
(0.0124) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0132) (0.0142) (0.0147)
Mother some college −0.0016 −0.0026 −0.0014 −0.0024 0.0011 0.0009
(0.0098) (0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0100) (0.0107) (0.0110)
Mother BA+ −0.0156 −0.0186 −0.0143 −0.0176 −0.0152 −0.0185
(0.0100) (0.0100) (0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.0114)
Dependent −0.0081 −0.0130 −0.0064 −0.0116 −0.0111 −0.0118
(0.0110) (0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0113) (0.0122) (0.0127)
Parental income −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0001 −0.0001
× dependent (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
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Business −0.0333** −0.0315** −0.0266 −0.0235
(0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0169) (0.0171)
Education −0.0229 −0.0213 −0.0317 −0.0323
(0.0150) (0.0152) (0.0166) (0.0171)
Engineering −0.0328 −0.0297 −0.0210 −0.0159
(0.0179) (0.0182) (0.0198) (0.0202)
Health −0.0291 −0.0337 −0.0394** −0.0424**
(0.0180) (0.0181) (0.0198) (0.0203)
Public affairs −0.0115 −0.00849 −0.00620 −0.00579
(0.0251) (0.0253) (0.0268) (0.0273)
Biology −0.0155 −0.0147 −0.0214 −0.0199
(0.0198) (0.0202) (0.0214) (0.0224)
Math/science 0.0226 0.0283 0.0404 0.0375
(0.0189) (0.0193) (0.0213) (0.0219)
Social science −0.0162 −0.0128 −0.0133 −0.0081
(0.0166) (0.0168) (0.0182) (0.0187)
History 0.0208 0.0235 0.0179 0.0103
(0.0295) (0.0297) (0.0312) (0.0320)
Humanities 0.0269 0.0301 0.0277 0.0305
(0.0167) (0.0170) (0.0185) (0.0188)
Psychology −0.0212 −0.0232 −0.0367 −0.0397
(0.0241) (0.0242) (0.0271) (0.0276)
Private for-profi t −0.0208 −0.0272 −0.0420 −0.0310
(0.0382) (0.0381) (0.0456) (0.0463)
(continued)
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270   Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private nonprofi t −0.0038 −0.0057 −0.0200** −0.0117
(0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0098) (0.0105)
HBCU −0.0805** −0.0803** −0.0644 −0.0604
(0.0322) (0.0324) (0.0349) (0.0366)
Competitive 0.0187 0.0197 0.0214 0.0120
(0.0160) (0.0161) (0.0173) (0.0185)
Noncompetitive 0.0079 0.0098 0.0130 −0.0050
(0.0174) (0.0176) (0.0190) (0.0203)
1997 earnings ($000s) −0.0006** −0.0005
(0.0003) (0.0003)






State fi xed effects No No No No No Yes
N 1,870 1,870 1,840 1,840 1,630 1,630
R2 0.0302 0.0434 0.0341 0.0483 0.0634 0.0911
Table 8.9  (continued)
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table shows coeffi cient estimates based on OLS regressions for the fraction of student 
loan debt in default in 2003. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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ent times. Total discounted payments are much lower from borrowers 
who default (without reentering repayment) early relative to late in their 
repayment period. Third, other forms of nonpayment are also impor-
tant, especially during early years. For example, deferment and forbear-
ance are more common than default 5 years after entering repayment. 
Even if borrowers eventually repay their loans, pushing payments years 
into the future can be costly to lenders, especially if interest is forgiven.
Differences between default rates and other measures of nonpay-
ment can be sizable. For example, our results suggest that modest 
black-white differences in default understate much larger differences in 
expected losses when measured by the fraction of initial debt still owed 
or in default after 10 years. The opposite is true comparing Asians and 
whites. Default and nonpayment rates are high for Asians 10 years into 
repayment, but the fraction of debt repaid within 10 years and the frac-
tion in default are not statistically higher than corresponding rates for 
whites. Although blacks and Asians default at similar rates, blacks stop 
paying their loans early while Asians enter default relatively late.
Not surprisingly, borrowers are less likely to experience repay-
ment problems when they have low debt levels or high postschool earn-
ings. These effects are robust and important. As a ballpark fi gure for 
all repayment/nonpayment measures, an additional $1,000 in debt can 
be roughly offset by an additional $10,000 in income. For example, an 
additional $1,000 in student debt increases the share of debt in nonpay-
ment by 0.3 percentage points, while an extra $10,000 in earnings 9 
years after graduation reduces this share by 0.4 percentage points.
Given the importance of postschool earnings for repayment, it 
is natural to expect that differences in average earnings levels across 
demographic groups or college majors would translate into correspond-
ing differences in repayment/nonpayment rates—but this is not always 
the case. Despite substantial differences in postschool earnings by race, 
gender, and academic aptitude, differences in student loan repayment/
nonpayment across these demographic characteristics are, at best, mod-
est for all except race. And, while blacks have signifi cantly higher non-
payment rates than whites, the gaps are not explained by differences in 
postschool earnings, nor are they explained by choice of major, type 
of institution, or student debt levels. Differences in postschool earn-
ings (and debt) also explain less than half of the variation in repay-
ment/nonpayment across college majors. We estimate little difference 
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Table 8.10  Explaining Fraction of Student Loan Debt in Nonpayment 10 Years after Graduation
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Male −0.0191 −0.0163 −0.0196 −0.0180 −0.0148 −0.0140
(0.0132) (0.0139) (0.0134) (0.0142) (0.0137) (0.0139)
Black 0.1340** 0.1350** 0.1590** 0.1560** 0.1590** 0.1580**
(0.0259) (0.0262) (0.0311) (0.0313) (0.0282) (0.0290)
Hispanic 0.0091 0.0111 0.0109 0.0121 0.0244 0.0214
(0.0282) (0.0283) (0.0289) (0.0290) (0.0265) (0.0300)
Asian −0.0033 −0.0100 −0.0006 −0.0067 0.0033 0.0083
(0.0434) (0.0434) (0.0443) (0.0443) (0.0432) (0.0453)
SAT/ACT Q2 −0.0184 −0.0190 −0.0197 −0.0207 −0.0052 0.0017
(0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0181) (0.0181) (0.0171) (0.0173)
SAT/ACT Q3 −0.0177 −0.0178 −0.0161 −0.0169 0.0028 0.0023
(0.0184) (0.0188) (0.0189) (0.0192) (0.0181) (0.0185)
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0266 0.0206 0.0275 0.0204 0.0394** 0.0411**
(0.0198) (0.0205) (0.0204) (0.0211) (0.0196) (0.0202)
Mother some college −0.0061 −0.0089 −0.0061 −0.0090 −0.0152 −0.0140
(0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0148) (0.0151)
Mother BA+ −0.0222 −0.0267 −0.0211 −0.0263 −0.0157 −0.0132
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0162) (0.0162) (0.0152) (0.0156)
Dependent −0.0014 −0.0054 0.0001 −0.0041 0.0019 −0.0015
(0.0174) (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0180) (0.0167) (0.0174)
Parental income −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0002 −0.0001 0.0000
× dependent (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
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Business −0.0358 −0.0345 −0.0112 −0.0101
(0.0248) (0.0252) (0.0232) (0.0235)
Education −0.0371 −0.0363 −0.0361 −0.0424
(0.0239) (0.0242) (0.0228) (0.0234)
Engineering −0.0300 −0.0258 −0.0171 −0.0084
(0.0284) (0.0291) (0.0272) (0.0277)
Health 0.0150 0.0100 −0.0216 −0.0266
(0.0286) (0.0290) (0.0272) (0.0279)
Public affairs 0.0062 0.0066 0.0328 0.0233
(0.0399) (0.0404) (0.0367) (0.0374)
Biology −0.0255 −0.0260 −0.0275 −0.0280
(0.0315) (0.0323) (0.0294) (0.0307)
Math/science 0.0099 0.0152 0.0413 0.0330
(0.0301) (0.0308) (0.0292) (0.0300)
Social science −0.0098 −0.0056 0.0062 0.0078
(0.0264) (0.0269) (0.0249) (0.0256)
History 0.0444 0.0451 0.0486 0.0359
(0.0470) (0.0474) (0.0429) (0.0438)
Humanities 0.0678** 0.0724** 0.0853** 0.0809**
(0.0266) (0.0271) (0.0254) (0.0258)
Psychology 0.0058 0.0038 0.0110 −0.0002
(0.0384) (0.0387) (0.0372) (0.0378)
Private for-profi t −0.0337 −0.0420 −0.0733 −0.0590
(0.0609) (0.0609) (0.0625) (0.0635)
(continued)
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274   Private nonprofi t 0.0091 0.0064 −0.0140 −0.0006
(0.0141) (0.0142) (0.0135) (0.0145)
HBCU −0.0864 −0.0758 −0.1270** −0.1170**
(0.0513) (0.0517) (0.0479) (0.0501)
Competitive 0.0163 0.0167 0.0235 0.0106
(0.0255) (0.0257) (0.0238) (0.0253)
Noncompetitive 0.0197 0.0200 0.0193 −0.00482
(0.0278) (0.0281) (0.0261) (0.0278)
1997 earnings ($000s) −0.0005 −0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0004)






State controls No No No No No Yes
N 1,870 1,870 1,840 1,840 1,630 1,630
R2 0.0228 0.0355 0.0241 0.0368 0.0655 0.0960
Table 8.10  (continued)
NOTE: *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. The table shows coeffi cient estimates based on OLS regressions for the fraction of student 
loan debt in default in 2003. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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in repayment/nonpayment across different types of institutions attended 
by students.
Our fi ndings raise a number of important questions. First, what 
explains the poor repayment performance for black borrowers condi-
tional on their postschool income, debt, and other demographic charac-
teristics? Recent research by Lochner, Stinebrickner, and Suleymanoglu 
(2013) suggests that parental transfers are an important determinant 
of student loan repayment for Canadian borrowers with low post-
school earnings. Given relatively low wealth levels among U.S. blacks 
(Barsky et al. 2002; Oliver and Shapiro 1997), it is likely that differ-
ences in parental support at least partially explain their high nonpay-
ment rates. This issue certainly merits greater attention.
Second, what explains the large differences in national cohort 
rates by institution type (e.g., two- vs. four-year or public vs. private 
schools)? Offi cial two-year cohort default rates for the 2010 cohort 
are more than twice as high at four-year for-profi t schools as they are 
at four-year public or private not-for-profi t schools (13.6 percent ver-
sus 6.0 percent and 5.1 percent, respectively). Yet, our results based 
on individual-level data suggest little difference in repayment patterns 
across institution types for college graduates. The discrepancy between 
our fi ndings and offi cial default rates can almost certainly be traced to 
much higher dropout rates at for-profi t schools than at public or pri-
vate not-for-profi t schools (Deming, Goldin, and Katz 2012) and much 
higher default rates for dropouts (Gross et al. 2009). In this case, the 
default problem at private for-profi t schools may simply be a symp-
tom of an underlying dropout problem. More generally, it is important 
to remember that our repayment/nonpayment patterns are based on a 
sample of baccalaureate degree recipients, and that some of these rela-
tionships might differ for borrowers without a four-year degree.
Third, with so many important changes in the labor market and 
higher education sector over the past few decades, how different would 
things look for today’s graduates? Recent evidence by Lochner, Stine-
brickner, and Suleymanoglu (2013) suggests that the role of postschool 
income may have become more important for recent students, consis-
tent with increased government attention to repayment enforcement. 
The increasing importance of college major as a determinant of earnings 
(Gemici and Wiswall 2011) suggests that greater differences in repay-
ment across majors for more recent cohorts might also be expected, but 
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Black 0.2160** 0.0554** 0.0853** 0.1080** 0.1580**
(0.0396) (0.0222) (0.0247) (0.0212) (0.0290)
Asian 0.1070 0.0718** 0.0888** 0.0031 0.0083
(0.0615) (0.0326) (0.0377) (0.0330) (0.0453)
SAT/ACT Q4 0.0289 0.0061 0.0062 0.0216 0.0411**
(0.0276) (0.0184) (0.0202) (0.0147) (0.0202)
Mother some college −0.0467** 0.0225 0.0076 0.0009 −0.0140
(0.0205) (0.0142) (0.0159) (0.0110) (0.0151)
Mother BA+ −0.0616** 0.0029 −0.0068 −0.0185 −0.0132
(0.0213) (0.0151) (0.0168) (0.0114) (0.0156)
Business −0.0200 −0.0810** −0.0507 −0.0235 −0.0101
(0.0320) (0.0310) (0.0294) (0.0171) (0.0235)
Engineering −0.0896** −0.0177 −0.0211 −0.0159 −0.0084
(0.0378) (0.0289) (0.0348) (0.0202) (0.0277)
Health −0.0073 −0.0475 −0.0195 −0.0424** −0.0266
(0.0380) (0.0268) (0.0287) (0.0203) (0.0279)
Social science 0.0783** −0.0221 −0.0136 −0.0081 0.0078
(0.0351) (0.0241) (0.0273) (0.0187) (0.0256)
Humanities 0.0826** 0.0008 0.0231 0.0305 0.0809**
(0.0353) (0.0226) (0.0252) (0.0188) (0.0258)
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HBCU 0.0409 −0.0049 −0.0399 −0.0604 −0.1170**
(0.0686) (0.0376) (0.0443) (0.0366) (0.0501)
1997 earnings ($000s) −0.0011** −0.0001 −0.0003 −0.0005 −0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0004)
2003 earnings ($000s) −0.0004 −0.0008** −0.0012** −0.0001 −0.0004**
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Undergrad. loan amount 
($000s)
0.0133** 0.0028** 0.0039** 0.0029** 0.0034**
(0.0012) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0009)
NOTE: **p < 0.05. The table shows estimated coeffi cients/average marginal effects from specifi cation (6) of Tables 8.6–8.10 if the esti-
mate is statistically signifi cant for any repayment or nonpayment outcome. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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this is far from certain given the modest role of earnings differences 
in explaining variation in repayment/nonpayment by college major in 
our sample. It is even more diffi cult to predict how other results might 
change. Data on more recent cohorts are obviously needed to better 
inform current policy debates.
We conclude by arguing that future research and policy discussions 
of student loan repayment need to move beyond an exclusive focus on 
default rates. Other forms of nonpayment are common, and the actual 
timing of default matters as much as whether default occurs.
Notes
We thank Brian Greaney for his excellent research assistance and Brian Jacob and other 
participants at the Conference on Student Loans for their comments. We would also like 
to thank the Institute of Education and Sciences at the U.S Department of Education for 
providing us access to the data. The research results and conclusions are ours and do not 
necessarily refl ect the views of the U.S. Department of Education. This paper has been 
screened to ensure that no confi dential data are revealed. The views expressed are those 
of the individual authors and do not necessarily refl ect offi cial positions of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors.
1. See College Board (2012) for these and related statistics.
2. See Schwartz and Finnie (2002) and Lochner, Stinebrickner, and Suleymanoglu 
(2013) for empirical analyses of student loan repayment, delinquency, and default 
in Canada.
3. Expected returns on income-contingent lending programs, such as the new Pay 
As You Earn student loan repayment program in the United States, can lead to 
full or partial loan forgiveness for borrowers experiencing low income levels for 
extended periods. This clearly lowers the expected returns on the loans. Further-
more, the timing of payments can affect expected returns if lenders have discount 
rates that are different from the nominal interest rates charged on the loans.
4. All averages in the tables in the chapter use the B&B panel weights to account for 
the sampling scheme of the original National Postsecondary Student Aid Study 
survey and attrition in subsequent surveys.
5. See Gross et al. (2009) for a survey of the literature on student loan default.
6. To understand the implications of these restrictions, we performed an analogous 
analysis without imposing the restrictions on months of postgraduate study and 
degrees. In regressions using this broader sample (analogous to those used in 
Tables 8.5–8.10), we also included indicator variables for the following graduate 
degrees: master’s level, professional degree, and doctoral degree. These results 
are qualitatively similar to those reported in the text, with a few exceptions spe-
cifi cally noted below.
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7. These quartiles are based on the test score distributions for the full population 
rather than our restricted sample.
8. Our repayment measures are based on individual loan records from the National 
Student Loan Data System, accessed in both 1998 and 2003. Loan status (for both 
dates) is determined from the most recent available status date at the time records 
were accessed. Our measures of default include borrowers who had defaulted or 
had expunged their student debt through bankruptcy. Since borrowers may have 
more than one loan in the system, we cycle through all government student loans 
in a borrower’s records and set the default indicator to one if any of the loans are 
determined to be in default (or expunged through bankruptcy). Similarly, if any 
loans are in deferment or forbearance, we set the indicator for deferment/forbear-
ance equal to one.
9. Default is defi ned as 270 days (9 months) of missed payments (excluding bor-
rowers in formal programs designed to reduce payment, such as deferment or 
forbearance).
10. Columns (7) and (8) report the sample averages for the shares of unpaid under-
graduate loans multiplied by the default and nonpayment indicators, respectively.
11. Throughout the chapter, we refer to results as statistically signifi cant based on a 
0.05 signifi cance level.
12. Tobit estimates generally yield similar conclusions about which variables are 
important and their relative magnitudes/signs.
13. Unfortunately, parental income is unknown for students classifi ed as independent.
14. When we do not exclude borrowers with longer periods of postgraduate studies or 
graduate degrees from our sample, Asians have default/nonpayment rates similar 
to those of whites and Hispanics.
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Table 8A.1  Sample Means for Full Sample and Borrowers Only











Mother no college 0.442 0.369
(0.013) (0.009)
Mother some college 0.280 0.263
(0.012) (0.009)




Parental income 25.453 41.417
× dependent (0.856) (1.151)
SAT/ACT Q1 0.286 0.272
(0.013) (0.009)
SAT/ACT Q2 0.282 0.290
(0.013) (0.009)
SAT/ACT Q3 0.247 0.259
(0.012) (0.009)
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Private for-profi t 0.022 0.016
(0.005) (0.003)










NOTE: Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Table 8A.1  (continued)
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Table 8A.2  Average Earnings, Undergraduate Borrowing, and Repayment/Nonpayment Measures in 2003 by 

















share of debt 
still owed
Not paying ×
share of debt 
still owed
Full sample 3,790 51.063 9.287 0.233 0.050 0.092 0.029 0.066
(0.864) (0.133) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007)
Males 1,620 64.951 9.426 0.206 0.050 0.091 0.029 0.060
(1.595) (0.216) (0.012) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010)
Females 2,170 39.755 9.176 0.254 0.049 0.092 0.029 0.071
(0.757) (0.165) (0.013) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009)
Asians 120 62.395 8.856 0.286 0.050 0.071 0.009 0.033
(3.150) (0.604) (0.063) (0.020) (0.023) (0.006) (0.017)
Blacks 260 44.910 9.464 0.523 0.098 0.207 0.110 0.243
(1.861) (0.394) (0.045) (0.019) (0.026) (0.036) (0.044)
Hispanics 230 48.860 7.823 0.198 0.070 0.122 0.017 0.055
(2.400) (0.552) (0.035) (0.022) (0.027) (0.006) (0.016)
Whites 3,150 51.032 9.356 0.210 0.045 0.082 0.025 0.055
(0.988) (0.147) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007)
SAT/ACT Q1 820 42.424 9.565 0.261 0.057 0.107 0.025 0.073
(1.211) (0.354) (0.023) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010)
SAT/ACT Q2 900 49.344 9.129 0.229 0.041 0.067 0.015 0.041
(1.447) (0.238) (0.016) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008)
(continued)
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share of debt 
still owed
Not paying ×
share of debt 
still owed
SAT/ACT Q3 880 56.850 9.132 0.189 0.038 0.082 0.020 0.044
(2.274) (0.251) (0.019) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006) (0.008)
SAT/ACT Q4 830 57.154 9.486 0.230 0.057 0.106 0.051 0.094
(1.739) (0.291) (0.016) (0.010) (0.012) (0.019) (0.021)
Mother no 
college
1,490 50.677 8.732 0.243 0.055 0.089 0.023 0.058
(1.254) (0.181) (0.016) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.009)
Mother some 
college
1,090 48.534 9.226 0.202 0.049 0.095 0.046 0.085
(1.339) (0.226) (0.013) (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) (0.016)
Mother BA+ 1,200 53.796 10.051 0.249 0.043 0.092 0.021 0.060
(1.891) (0.283) (0.017) (0.006) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010)
NOTE: The table shows sample means based on sample of borrowers without restrictions on graduate school participation/degrees. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
Table 8A.2  (continued)
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